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The national interest requires a new relationship with Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people. There can be no relationship without partnership. There can be no
partnership without participation.'
From the time the Whitlam Government introduced 'self-determination' as
its policy framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, there have
been many legislative versions of what this means in practice. This debate about
how Indigenous people's interests and needs can be best represented in legislation
has re-emerged after the Federal Government's announcement of the abolition of
ATSIC and its Regional Councils. J Both Indigenous peoples and governments
continue to struggle with the question of representation in the context of policy
formulation, funding arrangements, accountability, regulation, service delivery and
Indigenous peoples' human rights.
Regional governance for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is
often proposed as a means of addressing disadvantage and disempowerment, and
as better reflecting the priorities and aspirations of Indigenous communities than
national or state-based structures. In the wake of the abolition of ATSIC, both the
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native title Conference. 3-4 June 2004, Adelaide,
See: http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/conf2004/papers/pdfs/SamJeffries.pdf.22.
3 Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP, Joint Press Conference with
Senator Amanda Vanstone. Parliament House. Canberra. 15 April 2004, •
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Federal Government and Opposition indicated their support for working with
regional structures for Indigenous people,' as did other state and territory
government leaders.' Indigenous community leaders and organisations have also
expressed their support for the notion of regional governance as more akin to
traditional governance arrangements and as potentially providing more effective
and targeted representation and service delivery.
The paper firstly establishes the importance of Indigenous governance. It
then describes the emergence of regional governance as the preferred model of
governance for many Indigenous communities. The main body of the paper
examines existing legislative frameworks that enable some form of Indigenous
governance; their history, functions, powers, constituencies, funding bases,
associated organisations and representative mechanisms. These legislative
frameworks are the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) , the Aboriginal Land Rights Act
1983 (NSW), the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth), the Local
Government Act 1978 (NT) and the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 (NT). The
paper reflects on the legislation that establishes governance in Australia's external
territories, with a particular emphasis on the Norfolk Island Act 1979(Cth). It also
examines the recently repealed ATSIC Act 1989 (Cth) , the most comprehensive
national and regional governance structure that has existed for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people in Australia. Finally, the paper explores the Torres
Strait Regional Authority, the only part of the ATSIC regional governance
structure that remains and the model that many other Indigenous communities
refer to in their aspirations for regional governance.
In exploring these legislative frameworks, the paper will identify the
possibilities and limitations of such frameworks as vehicles for Indigenous
aspirations to regional governance, the lessons to be learned for the development
of future models and for government policy at all levels.
The impetus for regional governance for Indigenous communities raises
important challenges regarding representation, power, jurisdiction, capacity and
resourcing. Some of these issues can be responded to through legislation; others
have political, social and cultural dimensions that are matters for Indigenous
people to negotiate within their own communities as well as with governments.
The paper recognises that legislation is only one possible mechanism for
4 For example, see Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Indigenous Affairs, 'Minister announces new
Indigenous representation arrangements', 29 June 2005,
http://www.vanstone.com.au/default.asp?Menu=vips_22.05; Robert McLelland. ALP member
for Barton, speech, Aboriginal And Torres Strait islander Commission Amendment Bill 2005:
Second Reading, 15 March 2005, House Hansard, 31, See:
http://www.robertmcciellend.com/speeches/atsic15mar05.htm
, For example, see Northern Territory Government, 'Facilitating Indigenous Development',
Strategic Directions 2005-2007, http://www.ntgov.au/dcm/strategic/indigenous.shtml: Western
Australian Department of Indigenous Affairs, 'New voice for Indigenous people fostered by
Gallop Government', 2 July 2005, See:
http://www.dia.wa.gov.au/News/News 190.aspx
i27
The Promise ofRegional Governance for A boriginal and Torres Sf/'ail Islander Communilies
facilitating Indigenous governance, and by no means the best. Other mechanisms
include constitutional recognition of Indigenous sovereignty and rights to self-
determination, the establishment of a treaty or treaties between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians, and the assertion of Indigenous governance rights
outside of any official recognition of such rights. However, since legislation has
been the primary means for formally recognising Indigenous governance and other
rights in the past 30 years, it remains an important avenue for facilitating
Indigenous regional governance aspirations. With the abolition of ATSIC in 2005,
it is an important time to take stock of existing legislative approaches to
recognising and facilitating Indigenous governance.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have distinct rights relating to
their identity as the flfSt peoples of Australia. As colonised peoples, they assert
ownership and authority over traditional lands and sites of cultural significance -
rights that have been recognised to varying degrees by Australia's Parliaments,
Executive governments and the High Court.' Indigenous Australians identify as
sovereign peoples who never ceded their land and continue to feel separate, l)~)th
in identity and in the way they are treated differently from other Australians.' T',,,:y
also aspire to greater autonomy and control in the provision of appropriate se[\ -:es
in the areas of health, housing, and education, and recognition of Aboriginal law,
jurisdiction and self-government. Such aspirations are often expressed in the
l;'nguage of 'self-determination', an internationally recogrused right of all peoples
III freely deterrrune their political status and pursue their econorrllc, social and
cultural development.· Various international human rights treaty bodies have
identified self-determination as a right that is held by Indigenous peoples as
distinct groups - a right to participate in decision making over their traditional
lands and natural resources.'
The two main expressions of the Whitlam government's policy of self-
determination for Indigenous peoples were direct Commonwealth funding of
incorporated Indigenous organisations and C0mmunities, and the establishment of
elected Indigenous advisory or policy-maklllg bodies within the government
, For example, see Mabo v Queensland (no 2) (1992) 175 CLR I and Wik Peoples v Queensland
(1996) 187 CLR I.
7 Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia's Future, 2003, 95.
• Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights: Article 3 of the Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
, See for example, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on Australia, UN Doc
CCPRJCO/69/ADS, 25/4/2000. paragraph 10: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, List ofIssues: Australia, UN Doc E/C.12/Q ASTRAL/I. 23/05/2000, Issue 3.
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bureaucracy. '" This remained the bipartisan Federal Government policy framework
for Indigenous affairs until the election of the Howard Government in 1996, when
the Government indicated that it would no longer support the principle of self-
determination as the basis of Indigenous policy formulation and in particular, that
it would actively oppose recognition of Indigenous peoples' entitlement to such a
right in international negotiations, II The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander
Downer stated, 'We don't want to see a separate country created for [I]ndigenous
Australians. We will ... be arguing ... that it might be better to use the term self-
management rather than leaving an impression that we are prepared to have a
separate [I]ndigenous state.'" This move away from 'self-determination' by the
government confuses legitimate Indigenous claims for greater community
autonomy within Australia with an agenda for separatism that is rarely sought by
Indigenous people, II
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people share a number of common
experiences as a result of colonisation and subsequent government laws, policies
and practices that discriminated against Indigenous communities." There are a
range of issues relating to Indigenous collective rights, identity and welfare that
are negotiated at a national level - such as those relating to policy frameworks and
benchmarks for programs and service delivery. There is also an important role for
Indigenous leadership at a national level around issues relevant to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people across Australia, such as reconciliation, a treaty, the
impacts of government policy and associated political and media debates.
However, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are culturally and
demographically diverse peoples, facing a range of social and economic priorities.
Some Indigenous communities in Australia are formed around connections to
traditional lands, others to areas where governments forcibly moved Indigenous
families; some communities have emerged in connection with regional or urban
centres, others to sites of political or cultural significance, Not surprisingly, then,
there is a diversity of views amongst Indigenous people about self-determination
and its connection to issues of sovereignty and rights.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have long advocated for
greater participation in the decision-making institutions of the state and for more
autonomy in the form of devolved authority across a wide range of jurisdictions,
10 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Fifth Repor11997, 1998,39.
II Mick Dodson and Sarah Pritchard, 'Recent Developments in Indigenous Policy: The
Abandonment of Self-Determination?', Indigenous Law Bulletin 21, 1998.
"Dodson and Pritchard, above n 15.
IJ Behrendt, above n II, analyses Indigenous claims to self-determination and sovereignty and
argues that they are aspirations for greater community autonomy within the Australian state.
Behrendt also argues that there is very little interest in the notion of a separate Aboriginal state
within Australia.
" Megan Davis and Hannah McGlade. 'International Human Rights Law and the Recognition of
Aboriginal Customary Law', Background Paper No. 10, Law Refonn Commission of Western
Australia, March 2005, 7.
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including land ownership and management, health, welfare, economic
development, law and education." Despite many years of official policies of 'self-
determination', such aspirations remain current.
The incorporation of Indigenous organisations that has occurred over the
past thirty years has brought political and other advantages to Indigenous
communities, and has been described as providing 'ample evidence that
Indigenous organisations deliver more effective services than those available in
the mainstream'.16 However, others have described the incorporation ofIndigenous
organisations as leading to 'silos of factional power within communities', as
organisations have been required to compete with each other for local legitimacy,
scarce funds and staff. I' John Ah Kit has criticised the lack of transfer of skills and
capacity that accompanied the 'transfer 30 years ago of management of
communities to so-called self-management and self-determination' .1'
Community-based structures and processes are crucial to any Indigenous
governance system. However, as noted above, community-based organisations and
representative mechanisms face significant challenges and, for various reasons,
many do not have the capacity to adequately represent and serve their
constituencies. As our survey of legislation will demonstrate, the internal
governance, auditing and administration requirements in legislation establishing
Indigenous governance bodies and mechanisms are burdensome, and take valuable
time and resources away from the core representative functions and
responsibilities of Indigenous organisations.
Indigenous governance arrangements supported by governments to date
have tended to reflect jurisdictional and bureaucratic imperatives rather than
Indigenous aspirations and priorities. On the one hand, this is not surprising, given
that Indigenous peoples are chronically under-represented in the mainstream
government institutions that create these arrangements. I' On the other, the lack of
mainstream representation means that governments need to pay particular attention
to Indigenous priorities in establishing legislative mechanisms to facilitate them.
I' Diane Smith. 'Jurisdictional devolution: Towards an effective model for Indigenous community
self-determination', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 233,2002,6.
I' Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, above n 14,39.
I', Diane Smith, 'Jurisdictional devolution: Towards an effective model for Indigenous
community self-determination', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 233,2002,9.
I' John Ah Kit MLA, Northern Territory Government Minister for Community Development,
'Building stronger regions - stronger fl.ltures', speech to Local Government Association of the
orthern Territory, Alice Springs, 14 May 2003, 7.
I' See for example, Alexander Reilly, 'Dedicated Seats in the Federal Parliament for Indigenous
Australians: The Theoretical Case and Its Practical Possibility'(200 I) 2(1) Balavi: Culture. Law
and Colonialism 73 - 103.
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II. THE IMPETUS TOWARDS REGIONAL GOVERNANCE FOR
INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
Policy fonnulation and leadership at a national, state and territory level in
Australia has a history of not adequately reflecting the diversity of experiences and
priorities of different Indigenous communities. Equally, while past and current
initiatives represented as 'self-detennination' or as having 'grass-roots' legitimacy
have been focused at the community level, community-based structures face
considerable political and practical drawbacks. Many Indigenous people are of the
view that their needs and aspirations may be most effectively negotiated and
managed on a regional level.
In elaborating on the role of regional governance structures for Indigenous
communities in Australia, it is important to investigate what support such
authorities would need to represent and serve a particular group of Indigenous
people. Indigenous communities have been exploring such issues, including how
such groups may identify themselves; how jurisdictions may be recognised, and be
assigned power and responsibility; how such structures may function for remote
communities as distinct from Indigenous communities living in urban or regional
areas; how they may intersect with traditional owners in those areas; how non-
Indigenous people living in those areas may be affected by the establishment of
such structures; how such structures would be funded; how regional authorities or
such bodies may engage with other levels of government; whether they could
enact and police by-laws; and whether they would have a policy development
and/or service delivery role.
In New South Wales, the Murdi Paaki Regional Council has expressed the
desire to develop a regional governance capacity to improve access to resources
and opportunities through the region they represent in western New South Wales.'"
The Murdi Paaki Regional Council proposes that a regional authority would
represent and advocate for the interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
communities and people in the region; provide regional coordination to ensure the
equitable distribution of funding to communities; negotiate funding arrangements
and agreements with government agencies to meet the needs of communities; and
enter into service contracts with Aboriginal organisations; fonnulate a regional
development plan. 21
The Central Land Council (CLC) in the Northern Territory has also
proposed a 'new and innovative model' of regional governance for Aboriginal
communities in Central Australia that would deal directly with the Federal
Government for funding, and in tum, deal directly with individual communities."
'" Murdi Paaki Regional Council, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs' Inquiry into Capacity Building in
Indigenous Communities, 27 August 2002. 2.
11 Murdi Paaki Regional Council, above n 24, 12-13.
" Central Land Council, Evidence to Senate Select Commitlee on the Administration of
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The CLC has outlined certain key principles to guide the development of an
Aboriginal regional governance structure, including that it must be 'based in, or
compatible with, Aboriginal law'; have control over areas such as 'funding
allocations, economic development, service delivery'; have the 'power to enter
into agreements with all tiers of government, and third parties'; have the capacity
for 'monitoring, control and coordination of service delivery'; and ideally, 'be
provided for by a Commonwealth statutory regime'."
John Ah Kit, the Member for Amhem, has also advocated regional over
individual community governance and identified the key advantages of Regional
Authorities to be achteving a critical mass of competent, professional service
delivery personnel with proper support and guidance; informed engagement of
communities in decisions about what kind of services are appropriate and how and
where they will be delivered; accountability on the part of communities for the
decisions and the demands they make on service delivery organisations; and
avoiding the money for the delivery of services being wasted on administration
and duplication."
The Northern Territory Building Effective Governance Conference
recommended that Regional Authority structures and processes should be driven
by Indigenous people; recognise and build upon customary law and values; build
upon existing community strengths and capacities; and build upon the foundations
of both Indigenous culture and contemporary best-practice in order to achieve the
most legitimate and effective forms of Indigenous governance. " Peter Yu has
argued that regional governance is central to Indigenous participation in the
nation's society and economy.
Regional empowennent is ... the key ingredient to a reconciled Australia. When I raise
the concept of regional governance I am not advocating some fonn of separatism, but
quite the opposite. It is a mechanism that will empower Aboriginal people to negotiate
our inclusion and participation in the society and economies we share with our non-
Indigenous neighbours."
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner's
Social Justice Report 2000 identified the development of governance structures
Indigenous Affairs, ProofCommi/lee Hansard, 24 August 2004, 67. quoted in Martin Mowbray,
'If Indigenous Governance = local government, what are the options?', 2005 Seminar Se,',cs:
Indigenous Governance - Challenges, Opportunities and Outcomes, II May 2005, ,I,
http://naru.anu.edu.au/papersI2005-04-11Mowbray.pdf
2J Central Land Council, above n 26, 11.
"Central Land Council, above n 26, 14.
" 'Final Recommendations', Building Effective Governance Conference, labin!, Northern
Territory, 4-7 November 2003, See:
http://www.nt.gov.au/cdscalindigenous conference/web/htmIlFinal Recommendations.pdf
,. Peter Yu, 'Unfinished Business - National responsibilities and local ac!ions', in Sam Garkawe,
Loretta Kelly and Warwick Fisher (eds), Indigenous Human Rights, Federation Press, 200 1,251.
/32
Alex Reilly, Larissa Behrendt, George Williams, Ruth McCausland and Mark McMillan
and regional autonomy as having the potential for a successful meeting place to
integrate the various strands of reconciliation, In particular, it found that it is able
to tie together the aims of promoting recognition of Indigenous rights, with the
related aims of overcoming disadvantage and achieving economic independence, ,-
This support by a range of Indigenous people and organisations for regional
governance structures is in line with a range of policy statements made by various
non-Indigenous leaders and governments. In his announcement regarding the
abolition of ATSIC, the Prime Minister indicated his commitment to 'service
delivery and coordination at a grassroots level' through establishing 'different
mechanisms at a local level through consultation with communities and with local
government and with state governments'." In the introduction of its 'new
mainstreaming' arrangements in Indigenous Affairs, the Federal Government
noted that it would focus on 'regional need':
Initially the ATSIC Regional Councils will be consulted but, over time, the intention is to
work with regional networks of elected and representative indigenous organisations in
planning the delivery of govemment support to community endeavour. "
The negotiation of 'Regional Partnership Agreements' is one the Federal
Government's key policy initiatives in working with Indigenous communities,JO
The Federal Government has in the past indicated that one of its priorities is
'increasing opportunities for local and regional decision making by Indigenous
people'."
The 2005 report of the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of
Indigenous Affairs emphasised that 'it is imperative that effective regional
representative structures be retained' for Indigenous communities. J2 The
Committee recommended that the life of the ATSIC regional structures be
extended to 'facilitate the establishment of sound regional structures that are
supported by Indigenous people'." The 2003 report of the Review of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, In the Hands ofthe Region - A
" Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000,
2001.
"The Hon John Howard MP, Joint Press Conference with Senator Amanda Vanstone, Parliament
House, Canberra, 15 April 2004.
" Peter Shergold, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Management Advisory
Committee, speech to launch 'Connecting Govemment: Whole-of-Govemment Responses to
Australia's Priority Challenges', Report No.4, 20 April 2004, 4, See:
http://www.pmc.gov.au/speeches/shergold/collnecting government 2004-04-20.cfm
;0 Shergold, above n 33, 4.
" Executive Summary of the Commonwealth Govemrnent Response to the Council for Aboriginal
Reconciliation Final Report. Reconciliation: Australia's Challenge, September 2002, p. 2.
" Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs. After ATSIC: Life in the
mainstream?, March 2005, Chapter 2, para 2.71.
" Senate Select Committee, above n 35.
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New ATSIC, noted the need to accommodate the establishment of autonomous
regional govcrnance structures in the future that would allow communities more
direct dealing with governments and relevant agencies." The Understanding and
Implementing Good Governance for Indigenous Communities and Regions
conference (April 2002), staged by Reconciliation Australia, the National Institute
for Governance and the Aboriginal and Tortes Strait Islander Commission,
recommended exploring and enhancing the powers and functions of regional
authorities.
The benefits of regional governance arrangements have been documented
in local government reforms around the country, and are evident in areas such as
regional development, regional planning, land and resource management, and bio-
diversity conservation." Regionalism has been associated by Diane Smith of the
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research with effective policy measures
such as achieving a critical mass of competent professional personnel; economies
of scale in costs, infrastructure and service delivery; the facilitation of cost-sharing
and more streamlined financial management systems; transference of best practice;
and avoidance of duplication of services and structures." However, in outlining
such benefits, Smith also cautions that existing governance challenges - of
building governing capacity and internal accountability; finding experienced
professional staff; overcoming disruptive factionalism; promoting competent
leadership; achieving productive relationships with traditional owners and
governments - may simply gravitate from the community to the regional Icvd,
with potentially greater consequences."
It is important that a policy shift to regionalism is supported by a thorough
understanding of existing models, thl:ir limitations and successes, and workable
avenues through the current political environment. Investigation of the legal
framework for regional governance is particularly important given the
demonstrated need for a new approach in negotiating and managing Indigenous
affairs. Much of the difficulty associated with past policies affecting Indigenous
people and their rights has been the result of onerous legislation imposed from
above involving protracted, expensive litigation with little outcome for Indigenous
communities, or top-down approaches that do not take into account the priorities
and aspirations of those communities.
" The Hon. John Hannaford, Ms Jackie Huggins AM, the Hon Bob Collins, for Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, November 2003.
" Diane Smith, 'Building Effective Indigenous Governance, The Way Forward for Northern
Territory Regions and Communities: Background Issues Paper', prepared for the NT Indigenous
Governance Conference, Jabiru, 4-7 November 2003,14.
J6 Smith, above n 39, 14.
"Smith, above n 39, 14.
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The following survey of legislation reveals a wide range of approaches to
facilitating Indigenous governance. It is evident from the survey that each
legislative scheme responds to a particular political challenge at the time of its
creation, and that there is a considerable overlap and a lack of coordination
between the schemes. The ad hoc nature of legislation facilitating Indigenous
governance has been exacerbated by the abolition of ATSIC which, as a central
agency, offered a consistent national approach to Indigenous governance, and
regional governance in particular. However, the point of the survey is not to
criticise the existing legislative schemes but to learn from them. At the end of the
survey, we look to how the legislative schemes might facilitate Indigenous
governance in the future.
A. Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW)
New South Wales was the first State in the Commonwealth to implement a statewide land
rights regime for Aboriginal peoples. The regime that was implemented in New South
Wales was the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (The Act) remains structurally the same
in 2005. The Act provided for a representative structure that was local, regional and state
wide in scope. The preamble to the Act acknowledges the place of land and its relevance
and significance to the Aboriginal peoples of NSW. Notably, the preamble accepts that
land set aside for Aboriginal people has been progressively reduced without
compensation. J8
The Act establishes four bodies: the New South Wales Aboriginal Land
Council (NSWALC), Regional Aboriginal Land Councils (RALC), Local
Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) and the Registrar of Aboriginal Land Rights.
Local Aboriginal Land Councils are mandated to 'improve, protect and foster the
best interests of all Aboriginal persons within the Council's area and other persons
who are members of the CounciL' To this end, they can acquire land and use,
manage, control, hold or dispose of, or otherwise deal with, land vested in or
acquired by the Council and seek to protect lands of cultural significance to
National Parks and Wildlife Services. Regional Aboriginal Land Councils are
mandated to improve, protect and foster the best interests of all Aboriginal persons
within the Council's area and other persons who are members of Local Aboriginal
Land Councils in that area. They have functions that focus on assisting Local
Aboriginal Land Councils within its area and to the NSW Aboriginal Land
Council in the management, acquisition, use, control and disposal of land and
promoting the protection of Aboriginal culture and the heritage of Aboriginal
persons in its area.
J8 Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) - Preamble at p 2.
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The NSW Aboriginal Land Council is mandated to improve, protect and
foster the best interests of Aboriginal persons within ew South Wales and 'to
relieve poverty, sickness, suffering, distress, misfortune, destitution and
helplessness of Aboriginal persons within New South Wales'. It is charged with
the responsibility for the funding and administration of the land council system,
but can also acquire land to provide a limited range of benefits to Aboriginal
people in SW and to advise the Minister on matters rclating to Aboriginal land
rights. The Registrar's roles include keeping a register of claims made under the
act, approving the rules of the land councils, monitoring compliance and medIating
disputes.
The Act and Regulations have been amended numerous times since 1983
and the NSW Minister for Aboriginal Affairs announced a new review into the
NSW land rights system in May 2004 to 'overhaul the NSW Aboriginal Land
Council system'. 39
1. Regional Governance under the NSW Land Rights Act
Of the three bodies established under the Act, it is RALCs that are
modelled on the concept of regional governance, and will be the focus of this
analysis. Under the current Act, the role of NSWALC and the LALCs are
dominant over those of a RALC since amendments over time, particularly in 1990,
took powers that were originally vested at the regional level and placed them with
either the local or state land councils. The role of the RALCs was very much
focused on the protection of culture and the realignment of Aboriginal people in
NSW with their land base and have continued to participate in forums for the
development of regional strategies ranging from water reform, regional forestry
agreements, and issues relating to fisheries to name a few.'"
The benefits of expanding the role of RALCs are numerous. Firstly,
governments are geared towards regional service delivery models and therefore
governments do not have to expend funds on the establishment of networks that
disappeared when ATSIC was abolished. Secondly, the tiered system of
Aboriginal land councils allows certain 'checks and balances' by virtue of the fact
that Regional representatives are elected by LALC members to enable downward
accountability to the people at the local level. Further, the NSWALC has fiscal
oversight. Through reporting requirements there may be greater transparency of
RALC decision-making and planning processes. Thirdly, and extremely important,
is the fact that these are truly representative bodies. The RALCs are elected
officials and accordingly they are there to ensure outcomes for Aboriginal people.
If outcomes are not forthcoming then there is an election that may remove the
39 NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs, See:
htlp:l/www.daa.nsw.gov.au/daanewsl2/LCRupdate.html.
'" NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs, above n 4, 39
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under-performing representative.
The Act is currently being reviewed and possible changes include
realignment of the boundaries of the RALCs with the previous ATSIC regional
councils system, thereby making regional governance more acceptable to service
delivery agencies. The NSW Land Rights Act has provided for some form of
regional governance since its inception in 1983. Since no other state in Australia
has a representative structure as complete as that which is created under the Land
Rights Act in NSW, it remains an example of a legislated structure that includes
regional governance bodies to articulate the views of its constituents in designated
areas.
B. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) Act
1989
Despite its abolition in 2004, we include a brief appraisal of ATSIC in this
review because it was the most comprehensive legislative model of self-
representation for Indigenous people in Australia. Furthermore, the regional
council areas and representative structures are likely to remain the site for future
claims to regional governance.
The ATSIC Act created a Board of Commission and regional councils (who
at the time of ATSIC's demise numbered 35). All the bodies created by the ATSIC
Act were separate legal entities. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
decided membership of the regional councils through election. Each regional
council would elect their Chair. The ATSIC Act clustered the regional councils
into zones for the purpose of them electing a Commissioner to the Board.
Under the objects of the ATSIC Act, the Board of Commissioners and the
Regional councils are required to:"
• Ensure maximum participation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people in government policy formulation and implementation;
• Promote self-management and self-sufficiency of Indigenous
Australians;
• Further the economic, social and cultural development of Indigenous
Australians; and
• Ensure co-ordination of Commonwealth, state, territory and local
government policy affecting Indigenous Australians.
The ATSIC Board of Commission had legislated functions and powers.
Section 7 of the Act states a broad function for the Commission." However, three
key functions of the Commission were to advise government at all levels on
Indigenous issues; to advocate for the recognition of Indigenous rights on behalf
41 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth), s 3.
"ATSIC Act, s 7
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. of Indigenous peoples regionally, nationally and internationally; and to deliver and
monitor some of the Commonwealth government's Indigenous programs and
services.
1. Regional governance under the A TSIC Act
Section 94 of the Act sets out the functions of regional councils. These
included formulating, revising a regional plan and assisting the Commission in
implementing the plan, acting as a representative for people in the region and to
act as an advocate for their interests." One of the major differences between the
functions of the Commission and the regional councils was that the regional
councils had a legislated representative function that was not mirrored at the
Commission level. However, both levels of ATSIC had advocacy roles and this
meant that there was a representative voice at the national level, as well as the
regional level.
The devolution of planning and funding decisions to the regional councils
was a recognition that they were in a better position to identify local resource
needs than a national body. However, limited resources meant that councils were
forced to allocate the resources in accordance with priorities set out in the regional
plan and many of the larger programs, such as the Community Development
Employment Project (CDEP) and the Community Housing and Infrastructure
Program (CHIP), although delivered through the regional council system, gave
very little discretion to regional councils to fund on the basis of their stated needs.
Other government agencies with responsibility for providing Indigenous
programs commonly deferred to regional councils when issues affecting the
service delivery to Indigenous peoples were raised within their agency. This
attested to the effectiveness of regional councils as an institution of government.
Ironically, it may also have led to criticism of councils for failing to deliver these
services themselves, despite the responsibility lying squarely with the mainstream
agencies. The delivery of services to Indigenous peoples on how such programs
were designed and administered was closely scrutinised by the Commonwealth
Grants Commission. In 2001 the Commonwealth Grants Commission released its
Report on Indigenous Funding 2001. One of the major findings of the report was
that mainstream programs provided by Commonwealth agencies did not meet the
needs of its Indigenous constituents."
Two lessons for future regional governance models emerge from the
experiences of the ATSIC regional councils. Firstly, the regional councils were not
equal in size to the constituency that they represented. The number of Indigenous
people being represented did not correlate into the number of regional councils
and zone areas and the boundaries of these bodies were not decided on a per
"ATSIC Act, s 94(l)(a) -(e).
" Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report o/Indigenolls Funding; Main Findings, 200 I, xvi.
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capita basis. This was particularly true in Western Australia and the Northern
Territory. The number of Indigenous people represented by one 'metropolitan'
council and zone had equal weighting to regional councils and zones in remote and
rural areas where the Indigenous population numbers would be much less. A
system of representation whereby all Indigenous people are getting equal
representation should be a fundamental starting point in any regional governance
model that purports to be 'representative'.
The second lesson to be learned from the demise of ATSIC is that service
delivery and models of governance cannot ignore the States and Territories. The
ATSIC regime was structurally deficient in that it did not provide for adequate
liaison between the Commission, regional councils and State and Territory
governments. No regional governance model can be successful at overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage by shutting out a crucial piece of the service delivery
model. The COAG trial sites may highlight the inherent issues of co-ordinating
service delivery to Indigenous peoples that cross boundaries, not only
interdepartmentally, but also across jurisdictions.
The lessons from the regional governance model that was developed under
the ATSIC regime are many. During the course of its very politicised life, ATSIC
regional councils developed many strategies that assisted in the effective delivery
of services to its constituents. The role of regional governance is being expanded
across all spheres of the Australian community. Despite some teething issues,
regional councils achieved significant outcomes for their constituents and provide
a good model for future regional governance structures.
C. The Torres Strait Regional Authority
The Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) was the only part of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission to be maintained after the repeal
of the ATSfC Act on 24 March 2005." A number of Indigenous groups on the
mainland, such as Murdi Paaki Regional Council, have pointed to the TSRA as a
model for regional governance." In this section of the paper, we analyse the
strengths and weaknesses of the TSRA as a governance model for the Torres
Strait.
The TSRA was established as Part 3A of the A TSIC Act in 1994, and now
" Aboriginal And Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 2005 No. 32, 2005.
" 'We see the stmcture being translated into a Regional Authority or similar institution, along
similar lines to the Torres Strait Regional Authority which grew out of a regional council under
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989. The reason for this is that we
believe regional institutions are better able to assist communities, individuals and families if they
have greater powers of negotiation, coordination and agreement making which are recognised by
all spheres of govemment.' Murdi Paaki Regional CounciL Submission to the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait IsTander Affairs' Inquiry
into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities, 27 August 2002, 3.
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exists as Part 3A of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) Act 2005.
The Division and Section numbers of Part 3A of the new Act mirror Part 3A of the
ATSIC Act in all respects. Part 3A sets out the functions (Div 2, 142A - 142E ),
funding powers (Div 3, 142F - 142Q) and constitution of the TSRA (Div 4, 142R
- 142S), as well as detailed provisions for the holding of elections for positions to
the TSRA (Div 5, 142T - 143H) and for the administration of the Authority (Div
6, 143J - 144F). Division 7 of Part 3A (s144G - 144Q) established the position of
a General Manager for the TSRA. The General Manager is appointed by !hc
Minister and is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the TSRA. Tile
staff required to assist the General Manager are engaged under the Public Service
Act 1999 (Cth) (Div 8, sl44R). The relationship between the elected and
administrative anns of the TSRA is discussed in more detail below.
From the 1998-1999 fmancial year, the TSRA has negotiated its
appropriations as a separate agency. The increasing degree of autonomy of the
Torres Strait represented in this legislative history, has been a long-tenn goal of
Torres Strait Islanders. Advocacy for greater autonomy led to the establishment of
a House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs, A Report on Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders: A
New Deal (A New Deal) in 1997. The Committee accepted criticisms about the
operation of the TSRA, and recommended that the TSRA be replaced by a Torres
Strait Regional Assembly which represented all people in the region and was not a
dedicated representative body for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
The Committee's view was that the move to greater autonomy must be for all
people living in the Torres Strait, and not only Torres Strait Islanders:
Suffice to say here, that the concepts of equality: a full electoral Franchise; equal
opportunity; mutual respect and non-discrimination; provide the best basis lor achieving
democracy, accountability and greater autonomy."
The TSRA itself has called for a restructuring of governance in the Torres
Strait. In 2003, the TSRA submitted to the Minister for the Department of
Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) a proposal to Improve
Regional Governance in Torres Strait." Also, during hearings before the Senate
Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs (2005), many
submissions called for the abolition of the TSRA, and for an alternative
governance structure to take its place."
" House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs,
A Report on Greater Autonomy/or Torres Strait Islanders: A New Deal, 1997, 12.
"TSRA, A Proposal to Improve Regional Govemance in the Torres Strait - Proposed TSRA Bill:
A Submission to the Minister For Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, July 2003.
" See Official Committee Hansard, Administration of Indigenous Affairs, Thursday Island, 26
August 2004.
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1. The Legislative Context of the TSRA
The function and membership of the TSRA cannot be properly understood without first
explaining the pre-existing legislative framework for local government in the Torres
Strait upon which it was buill. There are 18 Island Councils in the Torres Strait
established under the Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 (QLD).50 Anyone
eligible to vote in Commonwealth or State Parliament elections is eligible to vote in
Island Council elections. In other words, eligible voters are not limited to Aboriginal
people or Torres Strait Islanders.51 However, only Torres Strait Islanders can stand for
election to an Island Council. Island Councils are funded through grants from
Commonwealth and Queensland governments. The functions of local government
including road maintenance, construction of public housing, water and sewage, childcare,
parks and outdoor facilities. Councils also employ police, administer island courts and
control entry onto land granted in trust to Torres Strait Islanders."
The Torres Shire Council (TSC) provides local government services to all
areas of the Torres Strait not covered by Island Councils. The TSC was created
under the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld). According to the Report on Greater
Autonomyfor Torres Strait Islanders (House of Representative, 1997), the TSC
represents more than half the resident population of the Torres Strait region,
including the majority of the non-Torres Strait Islanders in the Torres Strait,
primarily people on Thursday, Prince of Wales and Hom Islands." People can vote
either in the Island council election or the election for the TSC, but not both.
An Island Coordinating Council is set up under sections 139 -148 of the
Community Services Act 1984 (Qld). Membership consists of all the Island
Council Chairs and one person representing the Tamwoy community of Torres
Strait Islanders living on Thursday Island." The Council is established, among
other functions, 'to consider and advise any person on matters affecting the
progress, development and wellbeing of Islanders';" and 'to recommend to the
Minister and the chief executive concerning matters affecting the progress,
development and wellbeing of Islanders and the administration of this Act'." As
will be seen, in this role, the Council has similar functions to the TSRA.
2. Governance under the TSRA
The TSRA has an elected arm and an administrative arm. The elected arm
has 20 members: the 18 chairpersons of the Island Councils (elected under the
Community Services Act 1984 (Qld») and 2 persons elected through TSRA
"Community Services Act 1984 (Qld), ss37-47.
" Community Services Act 1984 (Qld), s43; Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), ss266-267.
"Communi(v Services Act 1984 (Qld), s34-43, and ss63-68.
" House of Representatives Standing Committee, above n 51, 20.
" Communiry Services Act 1984 (Qld), s 140.
" Community Services Act 1984 (Qld), sI41(1)(a).
" Communiry Sefvices Act 1984 (Qld), s 14\ (I )(b).
141
The Promise ofRegional Governancel'or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities
elections. The TSRA electors must be Aboriginal or TSI peoples and not have
voted in the Island Council elections (in other words, they are Aboriginal and TSI
peoples governed by the Torres Shire Council). Prior to the abolition of ATSIC,
the TSRA elected one of its members to be an ATSIC Commissioner. The
Commissioner was also the Chairperson of the Torres Strait Islander Board
(TSIAB) which is concerned with the interests of Torres Strait Islanders who
reside on the mainland, and who make up about 75% of the total Torres Strait
Islander population. ,. The TSRA plays a lead agency role, monitoring and advising
governments on the implementation of programs in the region outside the normal
departmental structures. Under SI42A(I)(f)(ii) of the ATS/C Act 1989 (Cth), the
TSRA had the power to advise the Minister on 'the coordination of the activities
of other Commonwealth bodies that affect Torres Strait Islanders, or Aboriginal
persons, living in the Torres Strait area.'
A Government appointed General Manager is the head of the administrative
arm of the TSRA." The General Manager is supported by staff elected under the
Public Service Act /999 (Cth). The General Manager is responsible for the
administration of all Commonwealth appropriations to the TSRA. The General
Manager and the members of the TSRA Board have an agreement called the
'Charter of Representation, Performance and Accountability' which helps defme
their roles and keeps lines of responsibility between them clear. It is designed to
ensure appropriate separation between policy-making by the elected arm and
financial management by the administrative arm. The agreement gives formal
effect to arrangements in place within the TSRA to ensure there are no conflicts of
interest between the elected arm and administrative arm and that the
administration responsibly advises and supports members of the Authority, and
implements the priorities and strategic directions that the Authority identifies.
ATSIC was based on a mixture of group identity and regional
representation. That is, it represented only ATSI peoples. But eligibility to vote
was based on location within an ATSIC region and not on identification with a
particular Aboriginal community. This model of representation has had a
oartieular impact on Torres Strait Islander peoples living on mainland Australia.
The 200 I census data shows that there are approximately 49,000 Torres Strait
Islanders in Australia. Of these, approximately 88% live outside of the Torres
Strait." Until the abolition of the ATSIC Act, the interests of these Torres Strait
Islanders were represented by ATSIC through the TSI Advisory Board and the
Office of TSI Affairs. One of the problems for these Torres Strait Islanders under
the ATSIC structure was that they constituted a minority group in all mainland
ATSIC regions, and thus had never been represented through a regional
" Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census, 200 I.
"ATSIC Act, sl44G.
" Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 61, see also Alison Murphy, 'Prescribed Bodies
Corporate in the Post-Determination Landscape' (2002) 5 Balayi: Cult/l/:e. Law and Colonialism
162,164.
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commissioner on the ATSIC Board. The report of the Review of ATSIC, In the
Hands of the Regions (2003), recommended that the place of the TSRA on the
ATSIC Board of Commissioners be replaced by the Chair of the Torres Strait
Islander Advisory Board to overcome this lack of representation. One of the
gaping holes left by the abolition of ATSIC is any dedicated representation for the
interests of Torres Strait Islanders on the mainland.
Torres Strait Islanders have criticised the current structure of the TSRA
from various perspectives. While recognising the importance of separating the
policy and administrative arms within government, some members of the TSRA
Board have expressed concern that the degree to which TSRA funding for the
Torres Strait is controlled by a government appointed General Manager. The
degree of external control is exacerbated by the fact that the Island Councils,
though established and empowered under Queensland legislation, rely on the
TSRA for a majority of their funding.'"
A related concern is the relationship between the TSRA as the regional
representative body for the Torres Strait and the Island Coordinating Council. As
described above, the functions of these two bodies overlap to a considerable
extent. According to their legislative functions, the TSRA 'recognises and
maintains the special and unique Ai/an Kastom of Torres Strait Islanders';
formulates and implements programs'; 'monitors the effectiveness of programs
and develops policy proposals to meet national, State and regional needs' (ATSIC
Act s142(1) (a) - (d)). The Island Coordinating Council oversees 'progress,
development and well-being for the purposes of State funding' (Community
Services Act 1984 (Qld), sI41). There is clearly a duplication of responsibilities
here, which is the product of the joint responsibility of State and Commonwealth
governments for funding development in the Torres Strait. The inefficiency of the
duplication is arguably lessened by the fact that the membership of the TSRA and
the ICC is substantially the same. In fact, some Councillors were of the opinion
that the overlap of membership and the overlap of legislative responsibilities under
the State and Commonwealth legislation meant that the current structure was
particularly effective. However, others argued before the Senate Select Committee
(2005) that the ICC was the most appropriate body to oversee the operation of
Island Councils as it is more directly accountable to the councils, and therefore to
the people."
Overall, testimony before the Senate Select Committee revealed a tension
between the strengths and weaknesses of the current governance model. There was
strength in the mirroring of regional and local representation as regional
representatives had knowledge of local needs and therefore of funding priorities.
On the other hand, some argued that the mirroring of regional and local
60 House of Representatives Standing Committee, above n 51,
" Official Committee Hansard, Administration of1ndigenous Affairs, Thursday Island, Thursday,
26 August 2004.
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. representation directed the focus of representatives away from local needs, and
also led to funding being controlled by a Commonwealth administrator (the
General Manager) who was likely to have no local knowledge of the Torres Strait.
The Torres Shire Council operates outside of the oversight of both the
TSRA and the ICC which are Indigenous specific organisations. The Report on
Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders (House of Representative, 1997)
recommended a restructuring of the current arrangements such that the TSRA be
replaced by another elected organisation, separate from ATSIC, which was
representative of all pe 'pies in the Torres Strait, and thus t'ucussed on
development in the Torres Strait as a region, and not just the ATSI peoples in that
region. The report pointed out that since ATSI peoples made up by far the majority
of peoples in the region, they would maintain effective control of regional
governance in the Torres Strait.
It is important to note that there are differences between the Torres Strait
and other Indigenous regions in Australia which mean that the governance model
in the Torres Strait might not be appropriate elsewhere. The first difference is that
Torres Strait Islanders account for a large percentage of the overall population of
the Torres Strait. A second important difference is that Queensland legislation
already implements a comprehensive Indigenous specific governance model upon
which the TSRA was able to build. To a large extent, in fact, the TSRA simply
mirrors the existing governance structure of the Island Councils and Island
Coordinating Council. No similar governance structure at the local level exists
elsewhere in Australia. As a result, the TSRA is the only regional council for
which the ATSIC Act did not govern the election of regional representatives and
ultimately the Commissioner for the Torres Strait on the ATSIC Board.
As some parties argued before the House of Representatives in 1997, the
existing level of autonomy within the Torres Strait might mean that the TSRA is
not the most appropriate governance model for the Torres Strait, though it may be
elsewhere in Australia. The Report on Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait
Islanders (House of Representative, 1997) concluded that ultimately (and perhaps
ironically) more profound autonomy for the Torres Strait will be possible if the
governance model represents all people in the Torres Strait and not just Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islanders. On the mainland, on the other hand, dedicated
Indigenous representation remains a priority given the minority population status
of most Indigenous communities.
It is perhaps surprising that mainland Indigenous communities are looking
to the TSRA as a model for regional governance, when Torres Strait Islanders
view the TSRA as an interim arrangement leading eventually to a greater degree of
autonomy for the Torres Strait. Nonetheless, there are a few clear lessons to be
taken from the TSRA governance model: First, the importance of strong
community representation on the body which is ultimately responsible for funding;
and second, the importance of a clear distinction between. advocacy for local
development priorities and representation at the national level for the needs of the
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region as a whole.
An umesolved question in relation to the Torres Strait is whether there
would be any advantage in abandoning the current model which focuses on the
special needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in the Torres Strait
(through the Indigenous specific Island Coordinating Councils) and, in its place,
adopt a governance and funding model that applies to all people resident in the
Torres Strait. The Report on Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders (House
of Representative, 1997) was firmly of the view that this was the future for the
region, and that a possible way forward was to create a new Australian territory in
the Torres Strait."' If the Torres Strait were to become a territory, the region as a
whole would move from block funding from the Commonwealth and Queensland
governments to untied grants to the region as a territory, possibly within the
Commonwealth Grants Commission funding model for the States and Territories.
Careful research into the impact on the levels and control of funding would need
to be done before agreeing to such a model.
D. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
There can be no doubting the importance of the recognition of native title to
Indigenous aspirations for self-determination and self-government. As more
claims have been finally determined under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA),
an initial emphasis- on establishing the nature and extent of native title rights has
given way to an emphasis on forming agreements. The strength of native title lies,
then, in the leverage it provides communities in negotiations with governments
and others.
Native title has a few clear advantages as a platform for regional
government. Its regional focus means that power is concentrated in local
communities. Its basis in land rights provides communities with an independent
foundation for negotiation with other parties with an interest in the land. Its
foundation in Indigenous law and custom is a recognition that Aboriginal peoples
have rights to land in Australia that predate non-Indigenous rights. The origin of
native title in Indigenous cultural institutions encourages communities to value
and protect those institutions, as the continuance of native title depends on them.
Finally, native title is pragmatic in focus. As native title coexists with other
interests in land, there is necessarily a focus on agreements.
There are certain inherent limits to the extent of self-government that can
be supported by native title. First, native title is held by distinct community groups
over distinct areas of land with fixed boundaries. This limitation has been
overcome to some extent through the lodging ofjoint claims under s61 of the NTA.
Second, native title is inalienable, and remains based on a relatively fixed, pre-
" House of Representatives Standing Committee, above n 51. 2.
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colonial relationship to land. The inalienable nature of native title means that every
agreement which sacrifices native title rights for some other benefit diminishes
native title irrevocably. The source of native title rights in the common law means
that it is vulnerable to future extinguishment by government, and a diminution of
the negotiating power of native title holders vis-a-vis co-existent statutory rights. 61
Because native title is only a right to land and waters, agreements are necessarily
framed around these concepts. Finally, the focus on land and economic benefits
rather than on a right to self-government means that there is a risk of creating
institutions for the management of native title that are not suitable for the broader
governance needs of Indigenous communities. Despite these limitations, native
title has been significant in focusing the site of Indigenous claims at the local and
regional level rather than the national level. Good community organisation has
been vital to the success of native title claims and the success of agreements which
use native title as a platform.
The NTA establishes two forms of organisation through which native title is
claimed and managed: Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) under Part II
of the Act" and Prescribed Bodies Corporate" (PBCs) under Part 2, Division 6 of
the Act. ... NTRBs are primarily service delivery organisations, assisting claimant
groups to run their native title claims. They are regionally based, but can assist
distinct communities to bring separate claims. There are currently 15 NTRBs.
They do not cross state borders, and in some States, cover the whole State (for
example, in South Australia). PBCs are land holding and land management
organisations. Under sections 56 and 57 of the NTA, native title holders are
required to form a PBC for the purpose of managing their title. Both NTRBs and
PBCs are required to be incorporated under The Aboriginal Councils and
Associations Act 1976 (Cth) (the ACA Act)."
1. Native Title Representative Bodies
NTRBs have a wide range of functions, which are in addition to any
functions that may be conferred on them under other legislation." Th\:ir primary
function is, on request", to assist potential native title holders in the preparation of
native title claims", and to assist PBCs, native title holders, or potential native title
OJ See for example. Sean Brennan, 'Native Title and the "Acquisition of Property" under the
Australian Constitution', (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 28, Alexander Reilly,
'From a Jurisprudence of Regret to a Regretful Jurisprudence: Shaping Native Title from Mabo to
Ward', Murdoch University E-Law Journal Vol 9(4) 2002.
"NTA, Sections 20lA - 203FH.
6S PBCs are also referred to as Registered Native Title Bodies Corporate.
6, Sections 55 - 60AA
" Section 20 I8 requires the registration ofNTRBs; and section requires the registration of PBCs.
68 Section 2038.
" Section 20388 (2).
" Section 20388 (I )(a).
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holders 'in consultations, mediations, negotiations and proceedings relating to'
native title related matters. 7I In addition to their functions under the NTA, NTRBs
have statutory responsibilities under the ACA Act, and until its abolition, the
ATSIC Act 1989 (Cth). NTRBs perform this wide range of functions under a high
level of legislative scrutiny. Among other duties, NTRBs must prepare a
comprehensive strategic plan which is approved by the Minister, keep good
accounting records, prepare annual reports with financial statements, and be
available for inspection and audit.
NTRBs apply to DIMIA for funding. Prior to its abolition, ATSIC was also
able to supply funds to NTRBs out of its discretionary budget. Being service
delivery organisations, NTRBs have limited scope for developing a financial base
outside of DIMIA grants. Most of the submissions to the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Native Title, Inquiry into the Capacity of Native Title
Representative Bodies (NTRBs) to discharge their duties under the Native Title Act
of 2004 (NTRB inquiry 2004), express concern that NTRBs are chronically under-
funded." The Report of the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of
Indigenous Affairs of 2005" noted that with the abolition of ATSIC and the
concentration of funding through The Department of Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), there was an increased danger of a
conflict between the Commonwealth's role as the funding agency of NTRBs and
as a potential adversary in a litigation process.
In addition to their legislative role, NTRBs are also community
organisations taking their membership from local communities and representing
their interests. In fact, most NTRBs pre-existed the NTA as community-based
organisations. David Ritter has pointed out that 'there is an inherent contradiction
... between being a statutory body with [specific] functions and being a
community organisation requiring a high degree of reflexivity to local community
needs and politics'." The hybrid nature of NTRBs is possible because in bodies
incorporated under the ACA Act 1976 (Cth), unlike under other Corporations laws
in Australia, the membership controls the corporation, and not a separate board. In
its submission to the NTRB inquiry 2004, the Office of Indigenous Policy
11 Section 203BB (1 )(b)(i) - (v).
" This concern was expressed by groups not represented by NTRBs but with whom they are
required to negotiate such as the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, see
submission to the Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account, Inquiry into Native Title Representative
Bodies, June 2004,
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/ntlf ctte/rep bodies/submissions/sub06.pdf
The Association was concerned, in particular, that NTRBs were not allocating fi.lIlds to future act
negotiations.
7J Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs, Ajier ATSIC: Life in /he
mains/ream?, March 2005.
74 David Ritter, 'So What's New? Native Title Representative Bodies and Prescribed Bodies
Corporate after Ward' (2002) 21 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 302, 307.
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Coordination (OIPC) suggested that this corporate arrangement makes
'governance in NTRBs difficult and unstable since ... control by the membership
fonns an uneasy partnership with quasi-statutory responsibilities and directors'
duties to the corporation'." The 0 IPC argued that NTRBs ought to be able to
incorporate under other Corporations laws with clearer division between those
within the corporate structure and the merribers it represented. OIPC also
submitted that non-Aboriginal organisations ought to be recognised as NTRBs.
2. Prescribed Bodies Corporate
When an Indigenous community has successfully made a native title claim,
the Native Title Act requires that the native title be held on beilalf of the native title
holders by a Prescribed Body Corporate established under the ACA Act." The PBC
can be in either a relationship of trust (s56) or a relationship of agency (s57) with
the native title holders.
The role of PBCs is to ensure that any dealings between native title holders
and others with an interest in the area in which native title exists occurs through a
legal personality with perpetual succession." The advantage for non-native title
holders is obvious. PBCs provide a legal entity with which to enter agreements
over native title related issues without having to find and negotiate with native title
holders themselves. The corporate structure of PBCs is in a familiar legal fonn to
non-Indigenous stakeholders, and persons with an interest in the land over which
native title is held do not have to do business with native title holders according to
the laws of those native title holders.
The advantages for the native title holders are not so obvious. A corporation
is able to 'acquire, hold and dispose of property, including communal property,
sue and be sued in its own right, can continue to exist if its membership changes
over time; and may protect its members from personal liability for acts undertaken
by the corporation. ''" Any advantages to empowering the corporation to carry out
these functions must be weighed against the fact that requiring a corporate
structure to administer native title adds a laver of complexity to existing
governance structures of traditional owners. Tl ~ Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner noted in hIS Native Title Report 2004 that
there has been concern that 'managing the corporate structures prescribed under
the NTA draws attention and resources away from building strong cohesive
governance within the traditional owner group itself."
" Submission, 19.
-, Native Title (Prescribed Corporate Bodies) Regulations 1999, reg 4.
-, See generally, Mantziaris and Martin, Native Title Corporations: a legal and anthropological
analvsis (2000), 100.
" Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report 2004,
32.
-, Native Title Report 2004, 31.
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There are particular features of the operation of Indigenous corporations in
the native title context which should be mentioned. Firstly, PBC membership is
restricted to the native title holding group." In his submission to the NTRB review
in 2004, John Basten stated of this requirement, 'Almost by definition, the people
to whom land is being returned are those who are least likely to have the
education, experience, resources or skills to administer and manage land
properly.''' He made a comparison between the role of Land Councils under the
NT Land Rights Act 1976 (Cth) and the NTA in this regard. In addition to
potentially excluding people who may have relevant expertise in managing a PBC,
the restriction of PBC membership might also exclude Indigenous people who
have a cultural or geographical connection to the successful claimants, but did not
participate in the claim. The membership of a native title claimant group does not
necessarily reflect the complex set of relationships that might exist on a claim
area. The restrictions on who can and cannot make a native title claim might, for
example, mean that a community defines itself more narrowly for native title claim
purposes, than it would in relation to other dealings on community land.
Secondly, although all members of a PBC must be native title holders, not
all native title holders need to be members of the PBC. So there is flexibility to
this extent in how the PBC is structured. It can, therefore, be either a
representative body (in a trust relationship) or allow for direct participation of all
members of the native title holding group (in which case the PBC is an agent for
native title holders).
Thirdly, PBCs are not provided with funding under the NTA. A regular
criticism of PBCs is their lack of resources. 82 In theory, since native title is meant
to provide a means to generate resources for communities through entering
agreements with others on native title land, there is no need for independent
" Regulation 4(2)(a).
" Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Land Account, Inquify into Native Title Representative Bodies, June 2004,
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/commiuee/ntlf cue/rep bodies/submissions/sub II.pdf. 3.
82 See, eg, David Ritter, 'So What's New? Native Title Representative Bodies and Prescribed
Bodies Corporate after Ward' (2002) 21 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 302. See
also, Alison Murphy, 'Prescribed Bodies Corporate in the Post Determination Landscape' (2002)
5 Balayi: Culture. Law and Colonialism 162, 164; Submission of NSW Native Title Services to
the Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Land Account, Inquiry into Native Title Representative Bodies, June 2004, See:
hllp://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/ntlf ctte/rep bodies/submissions/sub06.pdf 'Many
Aboriginal people who are the beneficiaries of determinations that native title exists are not
appropriately skilled to manage these organizations. They are unable to pay for external expertise
to pay for that assistance. There is however, no financial assistance provided to prescribed bodies
corporate to fulfil these obligations.' Submission of the Association of Mining and Exploration
Companies submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land Account, Inquity into Native Title Representative Bodies, June 2004,
See:
hltp://www.aph.gov.au/senate/commiltee/ntlf cltelrep bodies/submissions/sub06.pdf 4
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government funding of PBCs. In practice, however, the ability of native title land
to generate income for native title holders is highly variable across the country,
and there is not necessarily any income prior to a positive determination being
made. In addition, the Fingleton review of the ACA Act 1976 (Cth) noted that the
cost of maintaining PBCs was both in financial terms and in terms of the human
resources required to maintain the corporate structure. " For some native title
holders, the burden of establishing and maintaining a statutory corporation seems
disproportionate to the benefits they gain through the corporation. The PBC
structure involves number of complex legal relationships. There is a statutory
trust or agency relationship between holders of native title and the PBC governed
by the NTA. There is a corporate relationship which creates a raft of obligations on
the PBC to the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations under the ACA Act. This is
added to any pre-existing relationships native title holders have with each other,
and with others, within the native title area."
Mantziaris and Martin point to a variety of contradictions in rights and
obligations under these different relationships; including, 'non-congruence of
group and corporate membership, the cultural specificity of the corporate
governance model (in particular, the structure of the general meeting, and the
operation of the fiduciary principle), and the possibility that the fulfilment of the
corporation's obligations under the statutory trust or agency relationship may be
disturbed by an indigenous 'politics of representation' played out through the
governance structure of the corporation. 'ss These problems specific to PBCs in the
native title context compound the problems of cultural inappropriateness inherent
in corporate governance models such as the ACA Act 1976 (Cth), which is
discussed below."
The very different membership and structure of NTRBs and PBCs provides
two very different perspectives of potential regional governance models. For the
purpose of native title, the disjuncture between them seems unnecessarily strict,
particularly in the post-claim context in which they are both focussed on the
maintenance of native title rights. The disjuncture occurs in the first place because
of the restricted membership of PBCs. Although the restricted membership of
PBCs reinforces the basis of community membership in native title rights, it does
so at the expense of flexibility that is necessary in sustainable community
arrangements. The lack of flexibility is exacerbated by the requirements of
incorporation under the ACA Act, such as appropriate record keeping, and
reporting functions.
If native title is to be used as the platform for regional governance, NTRBs
would seem to have the greater potential as the representative regional body. In
'J Fingleton Review 1996. commissioned by ATSIC and the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, and
conducted through the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies.
" See generally, Christos Mantziaris and David Martin, Native Title Corporations (2000).
,. Mantziaris and Martin, above n 89, 182.
56 See Analysis of ACA Act.
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comparison to PBCs, NTRBs are more flexible in their membership, which is
particularly important if their role is to be regional in nature and not simply related
to native title issues. They also have the broader experience and expertise required
to manage native title needs within the broader framework of regional governance.
I. E. Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth)
The Aboriginal Councils and Association Act 1976 (Cth) (ACA Act) is to be
repealed by Act No 125 of2006 on 1 July 2007. The repeal follows acceptance of
recommendations in a government commissioned review of the Act conducted by
the law firm COITS, Chambers, Westgarth in 2002. In the following section we
outline the history of the Act, including three revisions of the Act since its
introduction in 1976. This history reveals that the original purposes of the Act
were not realised, and that this has led to its ultimate demise. It is worthwhile
setting out the history of the Act as we believe the Act, and particularly Chapter III
of the Act dealing with Aboriginal Councils, had considerable potential as a
legislative vehicle for regional governance.
The ACA Act provides a mechanism for the creation of Aboriginal
corporations under the supervision of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations.
The key benefit of incorporation is that it creates a legal personality for a
community through which it can enter legal arrangements with others. The
corporate structure thus created takes on the benefits and liabilities of any legal
agreements of the 'community and can survive the life time of individuals in the
community. The corporate structure also protects individuals in the community
from personal liability." The downside of the corporate structure is that it is
administratively complex, and takes a particular, culturally specific form.
Indigenous groups form corporations for a variety of reasons, including the
establishment of land councils, business entities ad service provision
organisations. Often incorporation is a requirement to gain the benefits of other
government schemes such as under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)."
The ACA Act has its origins in three reports in the 1970s" which recognised
that there were circumstances in which Aboriginal communities needed corporate
structures to organise their affairs, and that existing State and Territory legislation
were inadequate for this purpose. The ACA Act was designed to create a simpler
and more flexible process for the incorporation of Aboriginal corporations than
existed under existing State based corporations law and to provide corporate
structures that were more suited to the needs of Aboriginal communities." The
S' See generally, Matziaris and Martin, above n 89.
88 Reference to NTA.
" Report of the Committee of Review into the situation of Aboriginal people living on pastoral
properties in the Northern Territory (the Gibb Conunittee report 1971); the first and second
reports of the Aboriginal Land Rights Commission (Woodward reports 1973 and 1974).
., See Honourable lain Viner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. Hansard, House of Representatives,
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Second Reading speech of the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Ian Viner, also
reflected a commitment to Aboriginal self-determination: "The Bill is a tangible
indication of this Government's commitment to the principle that Aboriginals and
Torres Strait Islanders should be as free as other Australians to determine their
own future and to take their rightful place as citizens in the Australian
community.""
The ACA Act has three substantive sections. Chapter II establishes the
position of the Registrar of / boriginal Corporations. The functions of the
Registrar include, among other t ,ings, maintaining public rcgisters of Aboriginal
Councils and of Incorporated Aboriginal Associations; advising Indigenous
communities on the procedures for the constitution of Councils and the
incorporation of Associations under the ACA Act, and arbitrating disputes." In
relation to the constitution of rules of corporations under the ACA Act and the
compliance of Councils and Associations with those rules, the Registrar has a high
degree of involvement in the operation of these Indigenous bodies. Chapter III
provides a framework for the creation of Aboriginal Councils, and Council areas.
No Aboriginal Councils have been established under the ACA Act. Chapter IV
provides a framework for the incorporation of Aboriginal incorporated
associations. In January 2003, there were almost 3000 such associations
incorporated under the ACA Act." This represents about half of all Indigenous
incorporated associations." The other half was incorporated under State, Territory
or Commonwealth corporations laws. For many Indigenous communities,
incorporation under the ACA Act is a prerequisite to accessing various forms of
government assistance. 95
The Act has been reviewed three times since its inception. Two reviews
were commissioned by the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (Neate Review
1989, and Corrs, Chambers, Westgarth Review 2002), and one was commissioned
by the Minister and ATSIC (Fingleton Review 1996 conducted through the
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies). The terms of
reference of the Neate Review excluded Chapter III. The Corrs Review did not
exclude Chapter III, but focused predominantly on Chapters II and IV. Both
reviews focused on the effective operation of the technical aspects of the ACA Act
including the degree of flexibility in the creation of the rules of incorporation,
ways to improve compliance with the rules, and the role of the registrar in these
processes. The Fingleton Review was the only one to provide a significant
3 June 1976,2946; David Dalrymple, 'The Forgotten Option - Part III of the Aboriginal Councils
and Associations Act 1976 (1988) 2(32) Aboriginal Law Bulletin 11-13.
" Honourable lain Viner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Hansard, House of Representatives, 3
June 1976,2946.
"ACA Act, s5.
93 Senator Amanda Vanstone, Minister for DIMIA, Media Release, 15 January 2003.
"Fingleton Review, above n 87, 12. .
95 Fingleton Review, above n 87.
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appraisal of Chapter III. In addition, it analysed the Act within the broader context
of Indigenous governance.
As a result of the Corrs Review, the Federal government introduced a new
Bill into Parliament to replace the ACA Act, the Corporations (Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005. The most significant change in the new
legislation is the removal of Chapter III on Aboriginal Councils. In September and
October 2005, the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee conducted an
inquiry into the new legislation. At the time of writing, it has not delivered a final
report.
1. Chapter IV - Aboriginal Associations
Chapter IV contains detailed rules on the creation of Indigenous
incorporated associations, the rights and duties of members and directors, and the
powers and responsibilities of the Registrar in relation to Indigenous associations.
The requirements for incorporation are modelled on mainstream models of
incorporation.
The Neate Review 1989 made a series of recommendations for increasing
the accountability of Indigenous Corporations. According to the Review, this
could be achieved by tightening the rules of association and providing an even
greater role for the Registrar in creating and ensuring compliance with the rules.
The review led to a series of changes to the ACA Act.
The Fingleton Review was critical of the cultural appropriateness of the
ACA Act. The review concluded that there was 'practically no opportunity for
groups to adopt rules on the matters of most significance to them'. 96 Fingleton held
that many of the prescriptive requirements in the ACA Act were not culturally
appropriate. For example, Fingleton was of the view that membership of the
corporation should be a matter for communities and not the subject of rules of
association." Fingleton was also of the opinion that the rules for the holding of
meetings, including general meetings, do not reflect the decision-making
structures in communities;" and the extensive (and apparently growing) powers of
the Registrar have worked against culturally appropriate incorporations because of
the concern of the Registrar to ensure statutory compliance." Fingleton concluded
that incorporation has too often led to a loss of control over community affairs,
'rather than the legal recognition of traditional authority structures which was
promised'.lOo
Fingleton looked at the accountability of Indigenous corporations III
relation to their outcomes, rather than their compliance with the rules of
" Fingleton Review, above n 87,45.
97 Fingleton Review, above n 87,45-51.
98 Fingleton Review, above n 87, 56.
99 Fingleton Review, above n 87, 58-61.
100 Fingleton Review, above n 87, 62.
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association. Accountability should be, according to the review, primarily to the
community whom the association represented and to the wider community and not
only to the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations. The Review suggestcd paring
back the ACA Act, so that it was much simpler law, as originally intended, and that
the rules of incorporation be dependent more directly on the purpose for the
establishment of the corporation. For example, if a group was incorporating to
form a PBC under the NTA, the rules should be informed directly by the
regulations governing PBCs. Or if the association was to carry out a service
agreement, this should dictate the formation of its rules. In other words, the ACA
Act should only provide the most basic framework for incorporation. Beyond this,
its form should be controlled by its purpose, and those directly involved in that
purpose. This way the Registrar would have a vastly diminished role. None of the
Fingleton recommendations have been implemented.
The Corrs Review of December 2002 focussed more narrowly on
improving the technical requirements of incorporation, such as rules governing
membership, duties of directors, reporting, amalgamation, general meetings, and
the role of the Registrar. The review was conscious of issues of conflict between
corporate and cultural needs within the structure of an Indigenous association. '0'
To deal with these issues, the review recommended that Indigenous communitlcs
be provided with special regulatory assistance, dedicated education and trainll1g
and more flexible means of implementing and enforcing the rules of incorporat;( n.
It is the high level of prescription in the rules that gives rise to the need for spccml
assistance. The assistance is not based on the strength or particularity of
Aboriginal culture, but on its frailty. There is, in fact, one mention of Aboriginal
culture in Chapter IV; that is, that 'The Rules of an association with respect to any
matter may be based on Aboriginal custom.' '0' Many of the recommendations in
the COITS Review 2002 have been accepted by the Registrar of Aboriginal
Corporations, and the new Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander)
Bill 2005 is a direct response to it. '0'
The COITS review describes Chapter IV of the ACA Act to be a 'special
measure' under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). One of its focuses was
on whether there still needed to be this special measure. The assumption seemed to
be that the separate incorporation needs of Indigenous communities would
eventually cease and Indigenous corporations would use mainstream incorporation
laws. In the end, the Review concluded that this point had not yet been reached
and that special measures were still required. Understood as a special measure, the
ACA Act is a poor vehicle for a sustained Indigenous governance model. The Act
is not a model for sustainable self-government, but a concession to Indigenous
'0' COITS Review, Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Association Act 1976, Executive
Summary, 5, 7.
'01 S43(4).
'OJ Registrar of Aboriginal Incorporations. Reform of the ACA Act 1976 - Proposed new
CO/porations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) AcI, as at 17 March 2005.
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communities, which will become unnecessary over time. If the ACA Act is to have
any lasting potential as a vehicle for self-governance, this understanding needs to
be revisited.
Although the Corrs and Neate Reviews had a very different focus to the
Fingleton Review, common to all the reviews is the difficulty of any corporations
law to cater for the particular needs of Aboriginal communities, and the difficulty
of remaining simple and flexible. However, where Corrs and Neate still believe
there is a place for the ACA Act, Fingleton concluded that in its present form,
Indigenous peoples are better off using mainstream State or Commonwealth
statutes of incorporation.
2. Chapter III - Aboriginal Councils
Despite the findings of the Corr review of the ACA Act, and the omission of
Aboriginal Councils from the Corporations Bill 2005, we discuss Chapter III the
Aboriginal Councils section of the ACA Act in some detail because of its
significance for Indigenous governance. Under the ACA Act, Aboriginal Councils
have a potentially wide range of functions including, among others, the delivery of
housing, health, education and training, communication, roads, and welfare
services.'O' Councils also have the power to make by-laws, '05 and to impose minor
penalties for their breach. '00 In his second reading speech introducing the
legislation, the Minister described councils as 'a community corporation based on
a local Aboriginal social structure serving the special interests of that
community' .107
In the original version of the ACA Act, Aboriginal Councils could be
established by the Registrar in areas where government already existed under State
law, and could be binding on all peoples, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, in that
Council area. Thus, in its original form, the ACA Act could have been used to
override State based local government arrangements within a newly created
Aboriginal Council area. This may give rise to a difficult constitutional question
outside of the Northern Territory of whether the Commonwealth has the power
under s5l (xxvi) to make laws binding on non-Aboriginal people as an incident of
its power to make special laws deemed necessary for the people of any race, or
does the application of the law to others mean it is no longer a 'special law'?
The Queensland and Western Australian State governments under Premiers
Jo Bjelke-Petersen and Charles Court, lobbied hard for amendments to the Act
which removed this power in the Registrar. As a result, two key amendments were
made to the ACA Act. Section l6(aa) restricted Aboriginal Councils to areas where
,0> S II.
'os ACA Act s30.
'oo ACA Act s30(10).
107 Honourable lain Viner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Hansard, House of Representatives, 3
June 1976,2947.
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there was no local government in existence and no plans to bring the area under
the control of local government. Furthermore, under Section 17(4), the Minister
could only direct the Registrar to constitute an area as an Aboriginal Council area
after consultation with the States and Territories.
Upon receiving an application to establish an Aboriginal Council, the
Registrar has certain duties to explain and discuss the proposal. (ssI2,13) If the
Registrar is satisfied that a substantial majority of the adult Aboriginal residents
are in favour of the Council, that it will be able to fulfil its proposed functions and
that it will not overlap with an existing or proposed local government council area,
then the Registrar may establish the areas as an Aboriginal Council area. (s 16(1)).
The registrar then conducts the election of the first councillors (s21), and convenes
and presides over the first Council meeting (s22). The Council's Rules are
determined at the first Council meeting. (s22( 1)). These provisions parallel those
for Aboriginal Associations. Section 23(3) states that any of the Rules may be
based on Aboriginal custom. The law-making powers of the Council under s30 are
circumscribed in a few key respects. They must be approved by the Minister
(s30(4)) and they do not apply to non-Indigenous people (s30(9)). A similar limit
to s30(9) exists on Aboriginal Council laws under the Community Services (Torres
Strait) Act 1984 (Qld). This has led to relatively complicated local government
arrangements in the Torres Strait. 10.
Chapter III of the ACA Act 1976 does not provide funding for Councils.
Councils must rely on existing arrangements for funding of local government
under Commonwealth and State legislation. A decision whether or not to
incorporate a Council, might well depend on what funding arrangements can be
negotiated with Federal and State governments, and what revenue raising capacity
the Council has. The fact that Council by-laws do not bind non-Aboriginal people
in a Council area might severely curtail any revenue raising capacity. There have
been II applications for the establishment of Aboriginal Councils under the Act.
The first was in 1978 (Maningrida, Northern Territory) and the last in 1995
(Aboriginal Embassy)."" The applications were all abandoned, in most cases with
the applicants forming Councils or other governing bodies under State and
Territory legislation.
Given the hostility of State governments in the late 1970s to the
establishment of Aboriginal Councils under Commonwealth legislation at the
time, it is perhaps not surprising that few applications for establishing a Council
were made, and no councils have ever been established. However, it may be that
the present environment is more conducive to the establishment of Aboriginal
Councils. Firstly, a gap in service provision to Indigenous communities has been
created by the repeal of the ATSIC legislation and the consequent abolition of
ATSIC Regional Councils. In 1996, the Fingleton Review recognised the potential
10' See the section on the TRSA.
109 See generally, Fingleton. 97 - 113.
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of Aboriginal Councils should ATSIC Regional Councils be abolished. 'If [an]
Aboriginal Council did genuinely represent the interests and wishes of all
Indigenous people in its area, given its legal responsibilities and leaving land
matters aside, and was responsible either for funding or delivering a wide range of
services to these people, the ATSIC Regional Councils in some parts of Australia
would probably be superfluous.' 110
Secondly, there is a much better recent record of cooperation between State
and Commonwealth governments in relation to Indigenous Affairs. The COAG
trials are evidence of this, as is the fact that a joint State and Commonwealth local
government structure has been operating in the Torres Strait since 1994. III
Amendments required by the State government in 1978 which require
negotiation between the Commonwealth minister and the States before
empowering the Registrar to establish a Council under sI7(4) are consistent with
the philosophy of cooperative federalism, and agreement making which is being
pursued in Indigenous policy initiatives in Australia at the present time. Perhaps
ironically, the provision which has been the impediment to the establishment of
Councils may now be a strength of the legislation. Before an Aboriginal Council
was established, the Commonwealth and other government agencies must
negotiate suitable service delivery and funding arrangements in the region. This is
a sensible requirement and may avoid duplication of services and funding which
has been a significant failure of Indigenous policy in Australia.
The Neate Review 1989 did not assess Chapter III. The Fingleton Review
saw potential in Chapter III as a vehicle for Indigenous self-government. The
Corrs Review recommended Chapter III be repealed as it had been 'superseded by
other developments', though it does not adequately explain what those
developments were. lJ2 We are inclined to agree with Fingleton that despite the lack
of utilisation of the Councils provision of the ACA Act, in the current environment,
with the abolition of ATSIC and the level of cooperation between State and
Commonwealth governments, Chapter III of the Act may have considerable
potential as a model of regional governance.
Although the ACA Act would seem to have potential as a framework of
regional Aboriginal Governance, a few cautions about the limitations on the
potential of Aboriginal Councils need to be stated. Firstly, the limitation on the
application of by-laws to non-Aboriginal people under s30(9) seems to be highly
restrictive on the power of the Councils to effectively govern within the Council
region. Secondly, under the current legislation, the incorporation process, as for
Chapter IV is highly prescriptive and places a great deal of power and discretion in
the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations.
It is necessary to assess the benefits of incorporation under the ACA Act
110 Fingleton Review, above n 87, 120.
III TSRA and Local Government Act (Qld)
'" eOITS Review, 243, and Appendix G.
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agal t '.. ting tate and Territory structures for the creation of Aboriginal
Coun il to gaug the ignificance of Chapter III of the ACA Act. Part 5 of the
Local COI'ernment Act (NT) which provides for 'Community Government
Councils'. These Councils can operate in areas where there is no local government
yet in existence. The Aboriginal Communities Act 1979 (WA) empowers certain
communities to make by-laws on land which fs declared to be community land
under the Act. The by-laws are of limited scope, covering such things as
maintenance of and access to the land. The Community Services (Aborigines) Act
1984 (Qld) and the Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 (Qld), and the
Local Government (Aboriginal Lands) Act 1978 (Qld) have been used to create
Aboriginal Councils on the mainland and in the Torres Strait."' However, SA,
NSW and Victoria do not have legislation dealing with local or regional
government throughout those States. '" Overall, then, Chapter III of the ACA Act
provides a framework for regional governance that is not available at all or to the
same extent in the legislation of many States. Furthermore, a mechanism for the
creation of Aborigmal Councils in Commonwealth legislation is likely to be of
greater significance as a result of the abolition of ATSIC regional councils.
F. Indigenous Governance In The Northern Territory
The framework of local government in the Northern Territory has been
contentious ever since Aboriginal communities gained rights under the Aboriginal
Land Rights Act 1976 (Cth) (ALRA). Under the ALRA, over 42 percent of land in
the territory is held by Aboriginal traditional owners under inalienable freehold
title. Four Land Councils (Central, Northern, Tiwi and Anindilyakwa) hold the
land on trust for traditional owners. A perennial question under the ALRA is
whether the land council structure provides traditional owners with sufficient
control over decisions on their land, and whether it provides an adequate structure
for the self-government of communities.
Several local government frameworks co-exist with the ALRA. In some
areas, communities have incorporated under the ACA Act or under the
Associations IncOtporation Act 1990 (NT), or they have formed community
government councils under the Local Government Act 1978 (NT) (LGA) to govern
their communities."5 In 2004, there were 36 municipal and community councils
"' For a review and critique of this legislation, see Sean Brennan, 'Queensland Models of Self-
Governance' Submission to Review on the Aboriginal Councils and Association Act 1996,
Volume 2, Supporting Material.
'" There are some area specific arrangements. For example, in SA, Anangu Pitjantjatjara, which
was established under the Pitjantjaljara Land Rights Act j 981 (SA) is recognised as a local
governing body and receives local govenunent financial assistance.
'" Local Government Act 1978 (NT), Pt 5. See generally, Frith Way and Simeon Beckett, 'Land
Holding and Governance Structures under Australian Land Rights Legislalion', Discussion Paper
4 in Garth Nettheim, Gary Meyers and Donna Craig, ARC Collaborative Research Project,
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under the LGA. Seventy-eight percent of the territory population resides in 6
municipal council areas (Darwin, Alice Springs, Palmerston, Litchfield, Katherine,
Tennant Creek). The rest is divided among 30 community councils and 29 local
governing bodies established under other legislation, including the ACA Act.'"
Under the LCA, community councils have the same functions and powers as
municipal councils."- In addition, community councils can apply to the Minister to
enter 'community governance schemes' which might provide for alternative
powers, functions and electoral processes. '" In this way, the rights of traditional
owners can be recognised in the constitution of councils.'"
The municipal and community council areas account for only I% of the
land mass of the territory. This reflects one of the limitations of the local
government framework - the jurisdiction of local government is legislatively
confined to discrete areas where there are concentrations of the local population. It
is not co-extensive, for example, with the extent of community control of land in a
particular area that is within the control of land councils on trust for traditional
owners. Aboriginal associations are not so constrained to particular areas, which is
one reason that they have been used as the vehicle for the management of rights to
land under the native title regime.
Councils under the LCA are reliant on Northern Territory and
Commonwealth government funding. Municipal councils raise significant revenue
through the imposition of rates on housing, and various other types of charge. The
smaller community councils are less able to raise revenue in this way. Which
makes them almost totally reliant on external sources of funding. They also suffer
from a lack of infrastructure, and lack of education of local members, which
makes them even more beholden to NT and Commonwealth governments.
According to Martin Mowbray, under amendments to the LCA in 1993,
communities were offered financial incentives to use the LCA framework for local
government in preference to others, whether or not this was the framework best
suited to their needs. "' Mowbray identified a number of problems with the use of
community councils as the vehicle to protecting rights under the ALRA. Most
importantly, community councils were not required to consult with traditional
owners in relation to the use or regulation of land, as is required under the ALRA.
UNSW and Murdoch University, Governance Structures for Indigenous Australians on and Off
Native Title Lands, 1999.
'" Local Government Association of the Northern Territory, Submission to the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration. Inquiry
into Cost Shifiing onto Local Government and the Financial Position of Local Government in
Australia, July 2002.
III Local Government Act 1993 (NT) Pt 6.
"8 Local Government Act 1993 (NT), Pt 5, Div 2.
'" David Coles, 'The Marriage of Traditional and Western Structures in Local Government in the
Northern Territory', IPAA Conference, Darwin, 8-10 September 1999.
"' Martin Mowbray. 'Subverting the Aboriginal Land Rights ( 'T) A t 1976: The NT Local
Government Act 1993', Indigenous Law Bulletin. 1998 4 (10).
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Furthermore, the constituency of a community council may not be representative
of the group which has rights under the ALRA, as electors are not limited by
cultural affiliation, background or traditional connection to the land.'"
In 1997, the Reeves Review of the ALRA, Building on Land Rights for the
Next Generation recommended an alternative arrangement for managing rights
under the ALRA to bring land management issues under regional control by
abolishing the Central and Northern land councils, and replacing them with 16
'Regional Land Councils'. It recommended that the Regional Land Councils be
under the supervision of a peak body which would also perform the role of the
Native Title Representative Body for the Northern Territory, and would run all
economic and social advancement programs for Aboriginal people in the Territory.
The Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs
conducted an inquiry into the Recommendations of the Reeves Report. '" On the
basis of the submissions it received, it rejected the recommendations. Although the
principle of increased regional control under a peak body was accepted in
principle, it was recognised that the process of creating it needed to be controlled
by Aboriginal people and their communities. Aboriginal submissions to the
Parliamentary Inquiry expressed the concern that the new regional councils would
not necessarily represent the needs of traditional owners any better.
The structure of land rights and control of economic resources under the
ALRA remains central to Indigenous governance in the Northern Territory. At the
same time, local government has an important and growing role. Under the first
Labor government in the Territory elected in 200 I, the LGA has been promoted as
a positive model for governing Indigenous communities, in particular by the
Minister for Local Government, John Ah Kit. J1j The basis of these two models of
governance are distinct. Whereas the ALRA promotes the rights of traditional
owners, and entrusts the protection of their rights to land councils, the Local
Government Act 1978 is concerned with the provision of services on a regional
basis. In relation to the ALRA, it is clear who should be the beneficiaries of land
council decisions, and the challenge is to ensure that those beneficiaries have an
adequate voice '1"1 decision making processes. In relation to local government
under the LGA. !c difficulty is in identifying the relevant communities. If this is
done regionally. there is a difficult question of how to represent the particular
rights and cultural requirements of Indigenous communities. One option explored
by David Coles is to establish councils with many levels of representation. ".
Finally, even if satisfactory representative structures are established within each
III Mowbray, above n 124.
ill 'Unlocking the Future': The Report of the Inquiry into the Reeves Review of the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern TerritOlY) Act 1976, 1999.
'" See, eg, John Ah Kit, 'Local Government in the Territory - doing it better for our constituents'
Local Government Association of the Northern Territory, AGM, Darwin, 16 October 2003.
'1' David Coles, 'The Marriage of Traditional and Western Structures in [;ocal Government in the
Northern Territory', IPAA Conference, Darwin, 8-10 September 1999, 12 - 15.
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legislative scheme, there is the difficult question of how to balance the powers and
responsibilities of representative Indigenous bodies between them.
G. Governance In External Territories
Australia's external territories have varying degrees of self-government.
The Norfolk Island Act 1979(Cth) (NIA) establishes a Legislative Assembly and a
Supreme Court for the Island. The Lord Howe 1sland Act 1953 (NSW) establishes
a Lord Howe Island Board to administer the affairs of the Island. The Christmas
1sland Act 1958 (Cth) and the Cocos (Keeling) 1slands Act 1955 (Cth) establish
Western Australian law as the law for the islands, with provision for particular
Commonwealth legislation, and extend the jurisdiction of Western Australian
courts to cover legal disputes that arise on Islands. In addition, one former
territory, Papua, made the transition from self-government to independence. '25
With the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, A Report on Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait
1slanders: A New Deal (1997) recommending that the Torres Strait become a self-
governing territory, the arrangement of government in the external territories is
particularly instructive for Indigenous governance in the Torres Strait. Norfolk
Island has by far the most autonomous government of the existing external
territories. So we focus in this section on the experience of self-government under
the Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth).
1. Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth)
Norfolk Island is part of the Commonwealth of Australia. "' It became a
territory under the authority of the Commonwealth in 1913, and there have been
various legislative arrangements for its administration since that time.'!7 In 1976
there was a Royal Commission into 'matters relating to Norfolk Island' and
Commission examined the future status of Norfolk Island. "' At that time, all
options seemed to be on the table from excising the Island from the
Commonwealth altogether, to bringing the Island under Commonwealth control.
However, the Commissioner recommended that the Island be maintained as an
External Territory, and the Fraser Government subsequently committed itself to a
form of self government for the Island in the Norfolk Island Act 1979 (NIA).
Under the NIA, the Territory is administered by an Administrator,
125 Papua New Guinea Independence Act 1975 (Cth).
"' Benvick v Gray (1976) 133 CLR 603, per Mason J at [9]. See also Eggleston J in Newbery v
The Queen (1965) 7 FLR 34.
11- Norfolk Island Act 1913; Norfolk Island Act 1935; Norfolk Island Act 1957; Norfolk Island
Council Ordinance 1960; Norfolk Island Act 1963. See generally, Report of the Royal
Commission, 48-51.
"' Report of the Royal Commission into matters relating to Norfolk Island, October 1976.
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appointed by the Commonwealth Government. In fonning certain opinions
required under the NIA, the Administrator must rely on his or her own judgment.
In all other respects, the Administrator acts on advice. That advice comes from a
variety of sources depending on the category of matter involved. In some
instances, the Administrator is the senior representative of the Commonwealth on
the Island, acting on the advice of the Minister for Territories. In other situations,
the Administrator fills a role akin to the vice-regal function of a State Governor,
acting on the advice of the Norfolk Island Executive Councilor Legislative
Assembly. In still other situations the Administrator refers matters to the
Governor-General, who in tum acts on the advice of the Commonwealth
Government.
Part III of the NIA establishes an Executive Council to advise the
Administrator on 'all matters relating to the Government of the Territory'. '" Part V
establishes a Legislative Assembly which has plenary power to make laws for the
Island. The Assembly has 9 members chosen from the Island voting as a single
electorate. People are eligible to vote if they have been resident on the Island for 5
years. Part VII of the NIA establishes a Supreme Court and leaves the jurisdiction
of the Court to be determined by enactment of the Legislative Assembly. In 2004,
the No/iolk Island Amendment Act added Australian citizenship as a requirement
for future enrolment on the electoral role and as a requirement for standing for
election for the Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly. These requirements were
controversial among the Island population. ,J<)
In 2003, the Joint Committee on National Capital and External Territories
undertook a major review of governance on orfolk Island. A first report into
Governance on Norfolk Island was completed in December 2003. A second
inquiry is currently being conducted into the financial viability of governance
structures on the Island. The first report was highly critical of aspects of self-
government, and considered abolishing self-government on the Island altogether
as a result of perceived inadequacies in the model of government, including
widespread corruption. In the end, the Committee recommended retaining self-
government, but on the condition that there be substantial reform under the
supervision of the Commonwealth.
One issue of governance on the Island of particular relevance to our inquiry
is whether persons of Pitcairn descent should have any special representation. In
1856, people of Pitcairn descent were transferred to Norfolk Island. The original
intention was that the Island be reserved as a home for this population. III Pitcairn
descendants were the sole occupants of the Island at the time, under the
administrative control of the colony of NSW. Each family was provided with 50
acres of land upon which to subsist. All but one 50 acre allotment had been sold
119 Section I I.
IJ<) See Bills Digest No. II 1999-2000, NO/folk Island Amendment Bill 1999.
III Royal Commission 1976.37.
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off by 1976. Pitcairn descendants on the Island claim particular rights as part of
their customary practice, including communal grave digging and free burials;
access to land for basic necessities; availability of grazing on commons land;
maintenance of the Pitcairn dialect; and non-interference with life style involving
such things as self-help, family picnics, special festive days and observance of the
Christian religion.
In 1976, descendants of the Pitcairns made up about half the population.'"
The Royal Commission was of the opinion that there should be no special
government rights for Pitcairn descendants. It recommended that:
... while the Pitcairn heritage should remain a clear feature of Norfolk's history and way
of life, the Island should consciously strive towards a Norfolk Island identity and image
in the fllture.... Seldom does one sector in any society possess all the talents"" [N]ew
blood should have its opportunity to playa role in government and it will be to the
community's advantage for this to be encouraged.'H
The Commission recommended that eligibility to stand as a candidate for
local government should be a certain minimum length of stay on the Island. It took
strength in this conclusion from the recently passed Racial Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth).
The issue of governance on Norfolk Island has two distinct lessons as a
governance model. Firstly, if offers a reasonably successful example of self-
government in an external territory based on an economic base reliant mainly on
tourism. However, it also demonstrates the potential for corruption within a self-
government model due to the vested interests of representatives. This potential
exists even when the self-government model is contained in a comprehensive code
such as the N1A. Secondly, the attitude of the Royal Commission in 1976 and of
the Joint Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into Governance on Norfolk Island of
2003 is that the Pitcairn descendants on the Island should have no self government
rights that reflect their particular needs and interests. That is, the degree of
autonomy of the Island as a whole may come at the expense of any distinction
between the self-government rights of different groups on the Island. There may
be a warning for Torres Strait Islanders and others Indigenous communities here,
that is, that the protection of regional autonomy may come at the expense of the
identification of the protection of particular groups within the region. If for
example the Torres Strait were to become a self-governing territory, Torres Strait
Islanders might not be able to adequately replicate the Indigenous specific
protections they are currently afforded under Commonwealth legislation.
'J2 Royal Commission, p63.
IJJ Royal Commission, 89.
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III. LESSONS FROM THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
It is clear from the survey above that there is a large distance between the
expectations and the capacity to provide some framework for the development of
regional governance structures. However, there are aspects of these existing
legislative frameworks that provide some insights into the possibilities for an
effective regional governance structure.
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act provided for a
regional and national representative structure. ATSIC has been the only
Indigenous governance structure that operated with a direct relationship to
government through its policy formulation, program responsibility and its
monitoring and evaluation role. It was able to engage in thosc activities itself and
its legislative functions and powers. This gave it leverage and a greater potential to
influence policymaking and program delivery development in a meaningful way,
much more so than previous and subsequent national Indigenous bodies that had
an advisory only capacity. It would be an important aspect of any regional
governance model that it be given the capacity to influence policy making and
program delivery by providing powers and funding to ensure leverage and
influence.
Another strength within the ATSIC system that can inform future models is
its connection between regional and national governance. In theory, this meant that
regional concerns, issues and priorities could be drawn out and taken up at the
national level, but also there was, at that national level, the ability to consolidate a
wide range of views from across Australia into a co-ordinated, and therefore more
powerful, single advocacy position.
One of ATSIC's key weaknesses was its lack of a state/territory interface
with government at that key level. With so many Indigenous issues being shared
by state and federal governments - health, education, housing - and with some
being the primary responsibility of states - law and order - the failure to have a
tier of representation at this level as part of the structure weakened ATSIC's
ability to influence government. Any future model should look at integrating
regional governance into state and federal tiers of representation.
Another primary weakness in the ATSIC regime was the large gap between
what its responsibilities actually were and what peoples' expectations were of
what it could deliver. This showed the need for such bodies to be clearer with their
constituencies about what their functions and powers are, and what they are and
aren't able to provide. It also requires that other stakeholders, particularly
government, are clear about where such a body's responsibility ends and
government responsibility starts.
The Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NSW) also provides important lessons for
representative structures. Just as the ATSIC model showed the importance of the
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link between national and regional structures, the land council system in New
South Wales highlights the important link that needs to be made between regional
and local representation. Its structure also reiterates the need for a tier of
representation at the state or territory level. The other aspect of the NSW land
council system that can inform models of regional governance is the important
level of autonomy that can be gained for institutions that have an independent
funding base and the capacity to accumulate capital. This allows for the funding of
initiatives and priorities that government is unwilling or unable to support and
provides additional leverage in the development of policy and delivery of
programs.
One of the key weaknesses that can occur in a governance structure, evident
in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NSW), is that the attempts to regulate the
financial and governance arrangements - which go beyond what is expected of
non-Aboriginal entities - has meant that the legislation deliberately tries to limit
the benefits that can be given to members of the land councils. This seriously
impedes the capacity of the land councils to assist Aboriginal communities to
achieve improved socio-economic outcomes.
Much like ATSIC, the experience under the native title regime has been one
that has seen a large gap between the expectations of Aboriginal people as to what
the legislation can achieve and what that legislative framework can deliver in
practice. Aboriginal communities pursuing native title interests often express an
aspiration for self-governance as one of the desired outcomes of the process.
However, even giving them generous interpretation, the representative bodies that
the native title regime establishes - Native Title Representative Bodies and
Prescribed Body Corporates - have neither the powers nor the capacity to deliver
self-government to Aboriginal people in the manner that they would desire.
However, there have been some benefits to self-governance aspirations that
have flowed from the native title regime that are worth noting. In particular,
organising a loose collective into a structure can articulate and regenerate a shared
collective identity and therefore help to define and represent a particular
Aboriginal group or nation. It can become a type of nation-building process for
Aboriginal people who are then able, through their representative structure to more
effectively advocate on their issues, interests and priorities.
While this nation-building has been a positive side effect of the native title
process, the inability of native title organisations, particularly Prescribed Body
Corporates, to deliver regional governance highlights how legislation generally
does not consider this to be any part of their purpose. Such bodies are designed to
manage the assets and interest of Aboriginal people and have been designed within
a system that has had, at its heart, the primary goal of providing certainty for non-
Aboriginal purposes.
Similarly, the corporate structure provided within the Aboriginal Councils
and Associations Act seeks to establish organisations that are able to manage
Aboriginal assets and programs. They are established to fit Aboriginal people into
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a non-Aboriginal bureaucracy and governance practice and so offer very little
scope for the exploration of self-governance, except as an unintended by-product.
By comparison, the Torrcs Strait Regional Authority can attribute some of
its success to the way that its structure is built upon existing community council
structures. This has given the TSRA legitimacy amongst its constituency because
it is closely aligned and accommodates cultural governance structures. This has
meant that it is more effective and sustainable. Basing regional, but particularly
local, levels of representation on existing cultural models of governance should be
taken into account in the design of models for regional self-governance. There is a
limitation to the extent that the TSRA can provide a model for regional self-
governance and that is elected representatives have an advisory capacity only; they
do not have direct control of the distribution of resources. That ultimate power
rests with Commonwealth administrators.
The existence of forms of self-governance within the external territories of
Australia, such as Norfolk Island provides evidence that it is possible to have
systems of self-governance and heightened autonomy within the Australian state.
It is just that, to date, such autonomy has been an experiment within non-
Indigenous populations rather than Indigenous ones.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of existing legislative structures that could enable some for n
of regional governance for Indigenous communities highlights the importance uf
the political, social and cultural context in which such legislation operates.
Broader political will underpinning such legislative structures is key to their
effective utilisation and sustainability. Reflecting on which legislation has been
considered most 'successful' by Indigenous communities, it is those structures
which are clearly defined and limited in scope and mandate that fall 'l1to this
category, primarily because community expectations of their power and functions
has been met. The importance of analysing the value of legislation beyond specific
outcomes remains an outstanding area, such as considering the significance of
valuing ATSIC as an Indigenous governance structure in itself. Finally, it is
apparent that with any legislative structure, either that which enables some form of
regional governance as part of other purposes or that which is designed
specifically for such a purpose, the need to be able to appropriately reflect the
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INTRODUCTION
LARISSA BEHRENDT, JASON GLANVILLE, NORMAN LAING
Self-governance has been a consistent political aspiration for Aboriginal
people in colonial Australia. A growing trend of demanding that Aboriginal
communities incorporate in order to be able to access government money and
services has seen an intricate relationship develop between governance as a
political aspiration and corporate governance.
In the post-ATSIC environment, there is also a complex relationship
between a government policy move away from support for elected
representative bodies and the continuing desire for Aboriginal communities to
organise themselves to better manage their own affairs.
This collection of articles explores the way that Aboriginal communities
around the country are seeking to achieve their political aspiration to exercise
greater control over their own lives and in order to do so either seek to utilise or
subvert existing government policies and legislative frameworks. The work
collected in this volume is supported by two ARC Linkage grants, both with
Reconciliation Australia as the Industry Paltner.
The first project, 'Building stronger Indigenous communities', is a
collaboration between Reconciliation Australia working with BHP Billiton, the
Australian National University, the Australian Government, the Government of
Western Australia, the Government of the Northern Territory and 13
Indigenous communities. The study has looked at different models of
governance in 13 case studies around Australia to inform communities and
policy makers on the importance of governance within the Australian
legislative and policy environment.
The second project, 'Regional governance for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander conununities: the development of a legal framework and
practical models to address discrimination and disadvantage', is a collaboration
between Reconciliation Australia, the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law
and the Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning and has used the Murdi Paaki
Regional Assembly as its key case study on models of Indigenous self-
governance. Government leaders and agencies have identified more localised
decision-making by Indigenous communities as a policy priority. Despite this,
there is little comprehensive research regarding the legal and policy issues
associated with regional governance for Indigenous people in Australia. This
research project is undertaking in-depth legal analysis in this area and
developing achievable and practical models of regional governance for
Indigenous communities.

